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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this 
case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2-2(3) (j) and (4) (1953 
as amended). Plaintiff/Appellant timely filed their Notice of 
Appeal invoking the jurisdiction of this Court within thirty (30) 
days after the date of entry of the Judgment appealed from in 
accordance with Utah R. App. P. 4. Salt Lake County is the sole 
remaining defendant in this action. Plaintiff is appealing a final 
summary judgment order of Judge James S. Sawaya which disposed of 
all issues remaining before the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Whether any evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact 
that the width of Wasatch Boulevard with its shoulder could have 
proximately caused Mr. Hart to collide next to the northbound 
median line with a car driven by an intoxicated driver that crossed 
into Mr. Hart's lane. 
Appellee Salt Lake County agrees with Appellant's statement 
concerning the standard of review. Salt Lake County will argue its 
position citing evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable 
to Appellant Mr. Hart. Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney. 706 P. 2d 
614 (Utah 1985). Salt Lake County disagrees with Mr. Hart's 
assertion that evidence exists tending to show Salt Lake County 
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proximately caused Mr. Hart's injuries. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case. 
Appellee Salt Lake County only disagrees with appellant Mr. 
Hart's characterization on the nature of the case. 
On December 24, 1986, Mr. Hart was injured in an automobile 
collision occurring at approximately 5800 South on Wasatch 
Boulevard, a mountainous rural arterial roadway. An oncoming 
vehicle driven at a high speed by Robert E. Tweedy (Mr. Tweedy) , an 
intoxicated driver, crossed over the center line colliding with Mr. 
Hart's vehicle with a point of impact near the center median line. 
Mr. Hart's lane was thirteen feet wide, with a four foot paved 
shoulder and five feet of usable graded unpaved shoulder. Mr. 
Tweedy's vehicle was barely in Mr. Hart's lane, leaving Mr. Hart 
with the rest of his thirteen foot lane along with nine feet of 
paved and unpaved usable shoulder to avoid the collision if he had 
the time to avoid the collision. Mr. Hart states that he tried to 
avoid the accident, but, found the shoulder too narrow and opted to 
steer back across his lane into the collision. Mr. Hart asserts 
that Wasatch Boulevard should have conformed to current standards 
for the design and construction of new non-mountainous rural 
arterial roadways. Mr. Hart argues that if such standards were 
met, he would not have opted to steer back across his lane into the 
collision. 
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The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Salt Lake 
County upon the grounds that Mr. Tweedy was the sole cause of the 
collision, finding no facts to support Mr. Hart's position that an 
inadequate width of the shoulder was the cause, or a contributing 
cause of the accident. 
On appeal, Mr. Hart contends that the granting of summary 
judgment against him was erroneous and that sufficient evidence 
exists to create a genuine issue of material fact that the road 
failed to provide him with an adequate escape route. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On the evening of December 24, 1986 at approximately 7:00 
p.m., plaintiff/appellant Mr. Hart was driving his 1976 Toyota 
Landcruiser northbound on Wasatch Boulevard at approximately 5800 
South, Salt Lake County, Utah. (Amended Complaint para. 8, R. at 
81, SL Cnty's Answer para. 8, R. at 103, Affid. of Bringhurst & 
Wehrli para. 7, R. at 318). 
2. On the same date and time, Robert E. Tweedy was driving 
a 1969 Ford Bronco, while intoxicated and in violation of Utahfs 
DUI statute, Utah Code Section 41-6-44 (1986), southbound on 
Wasatch Boulevard at 5800 South. (Amended Complaint para. 9, 18(a), 
R. at 81 & 84, SL Cnty's Answer para. 9 & 18(a), R. at 104 & 105, 
Affid. of Bringhurst & Wehrli para. 7, R. at 318). 
3. Mr. Tweedy's vehicle while traveling in patchy fog, 
faster than the posted fifty mile per hour speed limit, crossed 
over the yellow median lines into the northbound lane, hitting the 
front corner of a Volkswagen van which spun into the southbound 
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lane and then collided with Mr. Hart's vehicle. (Amended Complaint 
para. 10 & 18 (f), R. at 81 & 85, SL Cnty's Answer para. 10, R. at 
104, Affid. of Reading para. 7, R. at 390, Tweedy depo. R. at 302, 
Affid. of Bringhurst & Wehrli R. at 318-319, Affid. of Salazar R. 
at 431). 
4. An investigation of the accident scene revealed no skid 
marks or other signs of evasive action on the part of the drivers. 
(Affid. of Salazar R. at 431). 
5. The point of impact with Mr. Hart's vehicle occurred next 
to the center median line in the northbound lane. (Affid. of 
Salazar R. at 431, Affidavit of Bringhurst & Wehrli R. at 319). 
6. The northbound lane is thirteen feet wide between the 
median line and the painted edge of the lane. (Becknell depo. R. at 
398-399). 
7. Plaintiff's expert measured four additional feet of paved 
road beyond the painted edge of the lane. (2nd Affid. of Reading 
para. 9, R. at 448). 
8. Plaintiff's expert measured five more feet of what he 
considered a graded usable unpaved shoulder of the road. (Affid. of 
Reading para. 8, R. at 390, 2nd Affid. of Reading para. 9, R. at 
448-449). 
9. Mr. Hart states that when he saw Mr. Tweedy cross into 
his lane and hit the car in from of him, he had a brief time to 
react. Mr. Hart states that he reacted by driving right toward the 
shoulder of the road, then perceived that the shoulder was too 
narrow and "steer[ed] back across [his] lane" into the oncoming 
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vehicle. (Affid. of Hart R. at 444). 
10. With the accident scene showing Mr. Hart's and Mr. 
Tweedy's point of impact next to the median center line of the 
road, and the Volkswagen van going or having gone into the 
southbound lane, there were no identified obstructions on the 
remaining portion of the northbound lane and the nine feet of paved 
and unpaved shoulder when Mr. Hart perceived and concluded the he 
could not avoid the collision by steering toward the shoulder. 
11. Plaintiff's expert expresses his opinion on ASSHTO 
highway standards on rural arterial roadways, but, never has 
rendered an opinion on highway standards on mountainous rural 
arterial roadways. (2nd Affid. of Becknell para. 4, R. at 437). 
12. Wasatch Boulevard around 5800 South runs along the side 
of a mountain and is a mountainous rural arterial highway. (2nd 
Affid. of Becknell para. 4, R. at 437). 
13. Wasatch Boulevard along the area of 5800 South was not 
designed, engineered or constructed by Salt Lake County. The 
County has only maintained the road since it was acquired by the 
County. (Kano Affid. R. at 433-434). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff's mistaken belief on a dark night with patchy fog 
that the shoulder of the road was inadequate to avoid a speeding 
drunk driver who suddenly pulled into his lane, does not create a 
genuine issue of material fact that an inadequate escape route 
existed, when plaintiff's Toyota land cruiser had nine to thirteen 
feet of unobstructed road and shoulder to avoid the collision if he 
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in fact did have time to avoid the collision. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO 
CREATE A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT THAT SALT LAKE COUNTY 
PROXIMATELY CAUSED PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES. 
This is a case where plaintiff/appellant Mr. Hart's mistaken 
perception and belief is being asserted to create a genuine issue 
of material fact. Looking at the evidence presented by Mr. Hart 
along with evidence Mr. Hart did not dispute or contradict, the 
thirteen foot wide northbound lane of Wasatch Boulevard at 5800 
South along with the nine feet in width of paved and unpaved 
shoulder provided Mr. Hart with twenty two feet of usable road and 
shoulder. The collision between Mr. Hart and Mr. Tweedy occurred 
next to the center median line of the road. Thus (taking judicial 
notice that Ford Broncos and Toyota land cruisers don't exceed 
seven feet in width), Mr. Hart had at least fifteen feet of usable 
road and shoulder surface to avoid colliding with Mr. Tweedy. Mr. 
Hart may have perceived that there was no escape route from patchy 
fog hugging the mountain side or from a foggy windshield. Whatever 
was the cause of Mr. Hart's misperception, he nevertheless had 
ample space to avoid hitting Mr. Tweedy if in fact Mr. Hart had the 
time to react. 
If Mr. Hart argues that the Volkswagen van blocked the north 
bound lane and part of the shoulder, he presented no facts to 
support such a position. The Volkswagen van spun onto its side 
into the southbound lane away from presenting any kind of 
obstruction to Mr. Hart's direction of travel. At most, one can 
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speculate that the Volkswagen for a split second swung over an 
increased portion of Mr. Hart's lane as it spun into the other 
lane. Still, Mr. Hart had at least nine feet of paved and unpaved 
usable shoulder, as well as whatever portion of his thirteen foot 
lane that remained unblocked, which he for an unknown reason felt 
was inadequate and steered away from. If Mr. Hart steered away 
from the shoulder from a miscalculation that the Volkswagen was 
heading into his northbound shoulder, it would have been perceived 
as an unavoidable obstruction where no amount of shoulder space 
would have been adequate. No matter how the Volkswagen is viewed, 
the trier of fact must speculate on why Mr. Hart, who asserts he 
had enough time to steer back and forth across his lane, opted to 
steer left "across [his] lane" and collide head on with a high 
speed vehicle as opposed to keeping to the right and at worst 
maneuver nine or more feet of unobstructed lane and shoulder to 
avoid side swiping a Volkswagen that was still moving in the same 
general northbound direction as Mr. Hart as it spun onto its side 
into the other lane. 
The affidavits of Mr. Hart's expert, Mr. Reading, are 
irrelevant and incompetent to this action since they only address 
the width of the unpaved shoulder as being inadequate, which by 
itself had nothing to do with this accident. This collision 
happened on the other side of Mr. Hart's lane next to the center 
median line, leaving Mr. Hart at least six feet of his lane and 
four more feet of the paved shoulder as an unobstructed escape 
route before the five feet of unpaved shoulder even comes into 
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play. Mr. Reading never mentions the point of impact being next to 
the median lane, or the thirteen foot lane and in his first 
affidavit did not even mention the four feet of paved shoulder. 
Further, Mr. Reading never considered how roadway standards are 
applied to mountainous highways. The highway standards opined to 
by Mr. Reading concerned arterial rural roadways on non-mountainous 
terrain. Wasatch Boulevard along 5800 South is on a mountain side. 
Mr. Reading states that his opinion is based on Mr. Hart's account 
of the accident, meaning that his opinion is founded on Mr. Hart's 
mistaken and unclear perceptions of the events leading to the 
collision. Beyond a bald assertion that an inadequate shoulder 
caused the accident, Mr. Reading never addressed the relevant issue 
of how nine to fifteen feet of unobstructed highway and shoulder 
space is insufficient for a six to seven foot (at most) wide 
vehicle to avoid a collision. If Mr. Reading believed that the 
twenty two feet of highway and shoulder space was largely 
obstructed, he never articulates what that specific belief is based 
on or what the obstruction was, if the obstruction had a 
predictable direction of travel or other material indications on 
why five more feet of usable shoulder would have made a difference. 
Finally, Judge Sawaya sua sponte questioned Mr. Reading's 
credentials as a highway expert since Mr. Reading is presently a 
practicing attorney. (See Transcript of Proceedings R. at 505). 
Mr. Hart and his expert have only presented unsubstantiated, 
contradictory, incomplete and vague assertions of inadequate 
shoulder space causing the collision. Viewing all the evidence 
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most favorably to Mr. Hart can only show that Mr. Hart was mistaken 
in his perception and conclusion of the road and shoulder being 
inadequate to escape the head on collision with Mr. Tweedy. To 
hold that such facts are triable would make governmental entities 
potentially liable in situations such as when a person fails to see 
and stop for a plainly placed stop sign, has a collision and 
asserts the stop sign was not there because he/she did not see it. 
Salt Lake County recognizes that on an appeal from a summary 
judgment in the County's favor, the evidence must be construed in 
a light most favorable to Mr. Hart. Apache tank Lines, Inc. v. 
Cheney, 706 P.2d 614 (Utah 1985). Further, Salt Lake County 
recognizes that summary judgments in negligence actions, 
particularly when involving causation issues must be given with 
great caution. Id. Nevertheless, even in negligence actions, 
summary judgments are still "a means for screening out sham issues 
of fact." Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1173 (Utah 1983). 
Further, summary judgment is appropriate in situations where no 
evidence is in dispute and but one reasonable conclusion can be 
drawn, or where bare contentions are unsupported by any 
specifications of facts calling for speculation, or where 
reasonable persons could not differ on the inferences to be derived 
from the evidence. Massev v. Utah Power & Light, 609 P.2d 937, 938 
(Utah 1980); Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 
487 (Utah App. 1991); Dvbowski v. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc.. 775 P.2d 
445, 446 (Utah App. 1989); English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154, 1156 
(Utah App. 1989) . In the present case, Mr. Hart and his expert Mr. 
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Reading in their affidavits assert that the shoulder of the road 
was inadequate to escape the collision. These general assertions 
are not supported by Mr. Hart's more specific description of 
driving across his lane, which was thirteen feet wide, away from 
the shoulder, which paved and unpaved was nine feet wide, into the 
very collision he states was unavoidable. The trier of fact is 
left to speculate as to the possibilities on why Mr. Hart thought 
he had no area of escape. The only inference on which reasonable 
persons could not differ, when construing the contradictory 
evidence supplied by Mr. Hart with the uncontradicted evidence, is 
that Mr. Hart failed for some unexplained reason to see the nine to 
fifteen feet of unobstructed space to avoid the collision or he in 
fact had no time to avoid the collision. Reasonable minds cannot 
differ that the width of the lane and shoulder had nothing to do 
with causing this collision. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Hart has not created a genuine issue of material fact 
concerning any act or omission of Salt Lake County having caused 
the collision between Mr. Hart and Mr. Tweedy. Viewing the 
undisputed facts most favorable to Mr. Hart, Mr. Tweedy was the 
sole proximate cause of the unfortunate collision. Accordingly, 
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this Court should uphold the entry of Summary Judgment. 
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